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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Article surveys and discusses significant employment law
cases decided in Texas during the Survey period beginning on No-
vember 1, 2008 and ending on October 31, 2009. Part II discusses
employment arbitration cases in which employees argued that their em-
ployment-related disputes were not subject to binding arbitration and
could be brought and maintained in a judicial forum. Part III turns to
developments in workers' compensation law, including the Texas Su-
preme Court's ruling on the question of whether a premises owner was a
general contractor entitled to the exclusive remedy defense awarded to
employers by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Discrimination and
issues surrounding covenants not to compete are the foci of Parts IV and
V, respectively, and Part VI examines the supreme court's consideration
of the interesting question of whether an employer has a duty to third
parties injured by the off-site conduct of fatigued off-duty workers.
II. ARBITRATION
In re Polymerica, LLCI considered an employer's petition for a writ of
mandamus in a case involving a dispute resolution plan contained in an
employee handbook. In 2002 dm Dickason Staff Leasing Company
(Dickason) agreed to manage the human resources department of
Polymerica, L.L.C., d/b/a Global Enterprises (Global). In July of that
year, human resources manager Angelica Soltero signed a dispute resolu-
tion plan applying "to any disputes between dm Dickason/Global Enter-
prises and any applicant for employment, employee or former employee,
* Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce University. The author ac-
knowledges the research support provided by the Alumnae Law Center donors and the
University of Houston Law Foundation.
1. 296 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
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including legal claims such as discrimination, wrongful discharge or har-
assment" and requiring the resolution of covered disputes in binding arbi-
tration. 2 Thereafter, in 2003, Global distributed an employee handbook;
at that time, all employees were required to acknowledge that the hand-
book "takes precedence over, supercedes, and revokes any previous
memo, bulletin, policy or procedure . .. on any subject discussed in the
Handbook."3 The handbook also provided that all disputes between em-
ployees and the employer "shall be resolved exclusively through arbitra-
tion under the Federal Arbitration Act," that the "dm Dickason/Global's
Dispute Resolution Plan and Arbitration Agreement is intended to pro-
vide a method for solving problems that is fair, prompt and effective,"
and that the acceptance or continuation of employment with the com-
pany after the effective date of the handbook "will mean that you [the
employee] have agreed to, and are bound by the [Dispute Resolution]
Plan." 4
In December 2005, Global ended its agreement with Dickason, re-
sumed operation and management of its human resources department,
and terminated Soltero's employment. Soltero filed an action in state
court alleging that she was fired because of her national origin and in
retaliation for reporting alleged sexual harassment.5 The employer peti-
tioned for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to compel arbitra-
tion of the employee's claims and to stay court proceedings pending the
arbitration.
Conditionally granting the requested writ, the Texas Supreme Court
rejected Soltero's argument that the dispute resolution plan was illusory
because the 2003 handbook could be modified at any time. "[The plan]
has its own termination provision, which requires notice to employees
and applies prospectively only. Because [the employer] cannot 'avoid its
promise to arbitrate by amending the provision or terminating it alto-
gether,"' the plan was not illusory.6 Nor was the supreme court per-
suaded by Soltero's contention that Global could not enforce the plan.
Both Global and Soltero were parties to the plan, and the plan applied to
"any disputes between dm Dickason/Global Enterprises and any appli-
cant for employment, employee or former employee."7 Although Global
did not sign the plan, the supreme court stated that it has "never held that
the employer must sign the arbitration agreement before it may insist on
arbitrating a dispute with its employee."8 And the fact that Soltero's dis-
charge occurred after Global's operating agreement with Dickason ended
did not call for a different result, the supreme court concluded. The plan
did not set forth any time limitation for the arbitration of disputes and did
2. Id. at 75 (quoting the plan).
3. Id.
4. Id. (quoting the handbook).
5. Id.





not provide that an existing relationship between Global and Dickason
was a condition for enforcing the plan. "Soltero's agreement to arbitrate
survives the dissolution of that relationship, and the Dispute Resolution
Plan explicitly covers former employees like Soltero."9
Whether a former securities broker must arbitrate his claim that he was
wrongfully discharged for failing to commit an illegal act was the question
before the Texas Supreme Court in In re NEXT Financial Group, Inc.10
Answering that question in the affirmative, the supreme court held that
the employee's claim fell within the scope of his arbitration agreement
with the employer."
In August 2007 NEXT Financial Group fired Michael Clements, a re-
gional manager, asserting that Clements had failed to perform certain re-
quired duties in connection with a National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) audit. Clements, alleging that he was fired because he
refused to conceal a trader's fraudulent "churning" transactions,12
brought a Sabine Pilot action against NEXT. 13 NEXT then invoked the
U-4 form executed by Clements when he registered with the NASD and
moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).14
The U-4 form provides, in pertinent part, for the arbitration of "any dis-
pute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm . . .
that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or bylaws
of [the NASD] ... as may be amended from time to time."' 5 At the time
of Clements's termination and the filing of his suit, the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure mandated arbitration of all disputes "aris[ing] out
of the business activities of a member or an associated person" but did
not require the arbitration of claims "alleging employment discrimina-
tion, including sexual harassment, in violation of a statute." 16
The supreme court initially addressed plements's contention that his
claim was not subject to arbitration under the FAA because his wrongful
discharge claim did not arise from a contract evidencing a commercial
transaction.17 Noting that the FAA's plain language provides for the ar-
bitration of disputes arising out of a contract containing an arbitration
9. Id. at 77.
10. 271 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 270.
12. "'Churning' refers to the excessive buying and selling of securities without authori-
zation, usually to increase a broker's commissions." Id. at 266.
13. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (recognizing a
narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for claims by an employee discharged
for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act). See also Marx v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 07-08-0022-CV, 2009 WL 1875505 (Tex. App.-Amarillo June
30, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs Sabine Pilot claim fails).
14. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
15. In re NEXT Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d at 265 (quoting the Uniform Application for
Securities Industry Registration or Transfer Form).





clause or a transaction evidenced by a contract,18 the supreme court rea-
soned as follows: "While Clements's wrongful termination claim may not
arise out of a written employment contract, 'the creation of an employ-
ment relationship . . . is a sufficient "transaction" to fall within section 2
of the [Federal Arbitration] Act."1 9 In addition, the supreme court
stated, "NEXT is a clearly intended third-party beneficiary of the U-4
and may compel arbitration in accordance with the terms of that agree-
ment, even though NEXT is not a signatory to the U-4."20
As for Clements's contention that his wrongful termination claim did
not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the supreme court
concluded that the applicable "business activities" language in the current
version of NASD rule 132000(a) covers and is inclusive of employment
and termination of employment claims.2' Noting the exclusion of statu-
tory employment discrimination and sexual harassment claims from
NASD-compelled arbitration, the supreme court opined, "There would
be no reason to have such an exception if employment-related disputes
were excluded from mandatory arbitration." 2 2 The supreme court deter-
mined, further, that the allegedly illegal and retaliatory conduct chal-
lenged in Clements's claim "involves 'significant aspects' of NEXT's
legitimate business activities, bringing the dispute within the scope of the
NASD arbitration clause." 23
The supreme court also rejected Clements's argument that his Sabine
Pilot claim was not subject to arbitration because NEXT's termination of
his employment violated the Texas Penal Code.24 NASD Rule 13201 ex-
cepts claims of employment discrimination from mandatory arbitration.25
However, that rule "does not except common law discrimination claims"
and "applies only to violations of statutes processing employment dis-
crimination." Further, the supreme court stated that it did "not view a
Sabine Pilot claim as a 'discrimination claim,' but even if it were, it is not
a statutory discrimination claim, nor is it converted into one merely be-
cause the underlying conduct might actually constitute a violation of
some other type of statute." 26
Arbitration was also ordered in another case, In re Labatt Food Service,
L.P.,27 wherein the Texas Supreme Court held that an arbitration provi-
sion in an occupational injury plan and agreement between an employer
18. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
19. In re NEXT Fin. Group, Inc., 271 S.W.3d at 266-67 (quoting Dickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971)).
20. Id. at 267.
21. See id. at 268.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 269.
24. Id. at 269-70. Clements argued that his discharge constituted a criminalized threat




27. 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009).
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and an employee who subsequently died mandated the arbitration of a
wrongful death claim brought by the employee's beneficiaries. 28 Writing
for the supreme court, Justice Phil Johnson agreed with the employer that
non-signatories to an agreement subject to the FAA can be bound to an
arbitration clause under rules of law or equity. Because of the derivative
nature of Wrongful Death Act claims,29 the "statutory wrongful death
beneficiaries' claims place them in the exact 'legal shoes' of the decedent,
and they are subject to the same defenses to which the decedent's claims
would have been subject."30 On that view, a pre-death contract can limit
or completely bar an action by wrongful-death beneficiaries. Moreover,
the supreme court reasoned, a ruling that the beneficiaries are bound by
the decedent's arbitration agreement was consistent with the FAA's re-
quirement that states treat arbitration agreements no differently than
other agreements.
The decisions discussed in this part evince the Texas Supreme Court's
willingness to enforce arbitration agreements and illustrate the preceden-
tial and jurisprudential hurdles facing employees subject to such agree-
ments who seek to litigate employment-related claims in the courts and
not before arbitrators. An agreement to arbitrate contained in an em-
ployment agreement or handbook or other relevant document is binding
and covers any and all disputes and matters falling within the scope of the
arbitration provision as measured and defined by the supreme court. As
current and past cases demonstrate, and as employees must and employ-
ers do recognize and understand, the supreme court has enforced and will
undoubtedly continue to enforce such agreements.
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
In April 2009 the Texas Supreme Court issued its decision in Entergy
Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers.31 The supreme court answered in the af-
firmative the question of "whether a premises owner that contracts for
the performance of work on its premises, and provides workers' compen-
sation insurance to the contractor's employees pursuant to the contract, is
entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy defense generally awarded
only to employers by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act."32
Entergy-Gulf States, Inc. (Entergy) contracted with International
Maintenance Corporation (IMC) to perform construction, maintenance,
and repair work at Entergy facilities. As set forth in the Entergy-IMC
28. Id. at 649. As described by the supreme court, the agreement provided "that dis-
putes related to . . . an employee's occupational injury or death must be submitted to
binding arbitration pursuant to" the FAA. Id. at 642. The employee, Carlos Dancy, Jr.,
signed the agreement and subsequently died at work from what appeared to be an asthma
attack. Id. The wrongful-death court action was brought by Dancy's parents and children.
Id.
29. See TEX. CIv. PRAC & REM. CODE AN. § 71.003(a) (Vernon 2008).
30. In re Cabott Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d at 644.
31. 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009).
32. Id. at 435.
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contract, Entergy provided workers' compensation insurance for workers
employed by IMC through an owner-provided insurance program. John
Summers, an IMC employee, was injured while working at Entergy's Sab-
ine Station plant. After applying for and receiving workers' compensa-
tion benefits, Summers brought a negligence action against Entergy.
Invoking the exclusive remedy immunity provision of the Texas workers'
compensation statute, 33 Entergy argued that it could not be sued in tort
by Summers and moved for summary judgment; that motion was granted
by the trial court.34 The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that Summers's suit could proceed because Entergy was not Summers's
statutory employer. 35
In a unanimous decision issued in 2007, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals. 36 The high court subsequently granted rehearing and
withdrew that opinion.37 After additional argument and consideration,
the supreme court, by a vote of 6-3, held "that the exclusive remedy de-
fense for qualifying general contractors is . . . available to premises own-
ers who meet the Act's definition of 'general contractor,' and who also
provide workers' compensation insurance to lower-tier subcontractors'
employees."38
The supreme court's majority opinion, authored by Justice Paul W.
Green, summarized the process by which a general contractor qualifies
for and is awarded Texas Labor Code immunity from common-law tort
claims brought by the employees of subcontractors. Pursuant to section
406.123(a), a "general contractor and a subcontractor may enter into a
written agreement under which the general contractor provides workers'
compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and the employ-
ees of the subcontractor." 3 9 The written agreement "makes the general
contractor the employer of the subcontractor and the subcontractor's em-
ployees only for purposes of the workers' compensation laws of this
state,"40 and places the general contractor under and within the protec-
tion of the aforementioned exclusive remedy provision.41 In addition, the
statute defines "general contractor" as a:
person who undertakes to procure the performance of work or a ser-
vice, either separately or through the use of subcontractors. The
term includes a "principal contractor," "original contractor," "prime
33. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 2006) ("Recovery of workers' com-
pensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensa-
tion or a legal beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee of the employer
for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the employee.").
34. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 436.
35. See Summers v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2004), rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009).
36. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1140, 2007 WL 2458027
(Tex. Aug. 31, 2007).
37. Id.
38. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 435.
39. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.123(a) (Vernon 2006).
40. Id. § 406.123(e).
41. Id. § 408.001(a).
542 [Vol. 63
Employment Law
contractor," or other analogous term. The term does not include a
motor carrier that provides a transportation service through the use
of an owner operator.42
Focusing on the plain language of the statute and examining "what the
Legislature meant by the term general contractor," the supreme court
stated that it was not challenged "[t]hat a premises owner can be a person
within the meaning of the statute." 43 What was challenged and disputed
was the issue of "whether one who 'undertakes to procure the perform-
ance of work' can include a premises owner, or whether that phrase limits
the definition of general contractor to non-owner contractors down-
stream from the owner."44 Applying common meanings of the terms
"undertake" and "procurement" and resorting to Black's Law Diction-
ary,45 the supreme court determined. "[A] general contractor is a person
who takes on the task of obtaining the performance of work. That defini-
tion does not exclude premises owners; indeed, it describes precisely what
Entergy did." 46
Buttressing this conclusion, the supreme court noted that the definition
of "general contractor" includes and specifies certain types of contractors
(principal, original, and prime contractors) in a non-exhaustive list. "If
we held that an 'owner contractor' is not analogous to" one of the con-
tractors mentioned in the definition, "we would essentially be strictly con-
struing a sentence that is explicitly non-exhaustive." 47 And, the majority
opinion continued, a reasonable reading of the statute's qualifying words
"either separately or through the use of subcontractors" in the definition
"recognizes the distinction between the owner who takes it upon himself
'separately' to procure the performance of work from subcontractors, and
42. Id. § 406.121(1).
43. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 437.
44. Id.
45. "According to Black's Law Dictionary, 'undertake' generally means to 'take on an
obligation or task,' and 'procurement' means 'the act of getting or obtaining something."'
Id. at 437-38 (quoting BLACK's LAw DIClONARY 1665, 1327 (9th ed. 2009)). The supreme
court's reference to the common understanding of statutory terms found in the "general
contractor" definition is difficult to square with its declaration that ordinary or common
understandings do not apply or govern when the legislature has defined a term. See id. at
437.
46. Id. at 438. Dissenting Justice Harriet O'Neill, joined by Chief Justice Wallace B.
Jefferson and Justice David Medina, argued that treating a premises owner as a general
contractor is inconsistent with the common meaning of the term "contractor." Under
Texas statutory and common law, "a contractor is generally understood to be a person or
entity that enters into a contract with another for compensation" or "'any person who, in
the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other
persons."' Id. at 483 (emphasis added) (O'Neill, J., dissenting) (citing Indus. Indem. Exch.
v. Southard, 138 Tex. 531, 160 S.W.2d 905, 907 (1942) (quoting Shannon v. W. Indem. Co.,
257 S.W. 522, 524 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1924)). Moreover, the justice stated, the terms and
illustrative language of section 406.121(1) "envision a tripartite relationship in which one
entity enters into a contract to perform work for another and then retains subcontractors
or independent contractors to do all or part of the work." Id. at 484. Acknowledging that
section 40 6 .121(1)'s categories are not exhaustive, Justice O'Neill pointed out that the stat-
ute makes clear that only analogous entities should be considered general contractors: "A
premises owner is simply not analogous." Id. at 485.
47. Id. at 440.
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the owner who undertakes with a middleman 'general contractor' to pro-
cure the performance of work 'through the use of subcontractors. '"48 For
the supreme court, "[t]his qualifier suggests that the Legislature at least
contemplated the existence of a premises owner who may want to act as
its own general contractor-an outcome that is by no means
uncommon."49
Having concluded that the plain language of the statute is unambigu-
ous and that there was no need to resort to extrinsic interpretive aids,50
the supreme court opined that, even if the "general contractor" definition
was ambiguous, the legislative history favored Entergy.51 Prior to 1989, a
"subcontractor" was statutorily defined as "a person who has contracted
to perform all or any part of the work or services which a prime contrac-
tor has contracted with another party to perform." 52 Amended by the
Texas legislature in 1989, the "with another party" language was deleted
from the definition.53 In the supreme court's view:
the deletion of language better indicates the Legislature's intent to
remove its effect, rather than to preserve it. Thus, the removal of the
phrase 'with another party' from the subcontractor definition favors,
rather than argues against, an interpretation allowing premises own-
ers to act as their own general contractors for the purpose of work-
ers' compensation laws. 5 4
In another part of its opinion, the supreme court posited that the exclu-
sion of a premises owner acting as a general contractor does not serve the
public policy favoring the encouragement of workers' compensation for
all employees.55 Protecting the general contractor who can assert the ex-
clusive remedy defense, but not the premises owner who provides work-
ers' compensation to all contractors and contractors' employees working
at the owner's facility, would have the following result and consequence:
48. Id. at 441.
49. Id.
50. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Nathan L. Hecht argued that the pertinent
statutory text was ambiguous because both the majority's and the dissent's statutory con-
structions were reasonable. "[I]t is true, as the Court contends, that a person who engages
subcontractors to work on his own property is often said to act as his own general contrac-
tor and certainly performs that function." Id. at 448 (Hecht, J., concurring). But "more
often, as the dissent contends, a general contractor is thought of as a person who works for
someone else, like a property owner, subcontracting parts of a job to others as appropriate
.... The text, it must therefore be said, is ambiguous." Id.; see also id. at 451 ("[G]eneral
contractor often refers to someone who works for the job owner. This reading of the stat-
ute is a reasonable one, in my view, but it is not the only reasonable one.").
51. Id. at 477-78.
52. Id. at 443 (emphasis added) (quoting Act of May 28, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 950,
§ 1).
53. See id.
54. Id. Dissenting Justice O'Neill was not persuaded. "Because 'contract[ing] with
another party' is inherent in the nature of general contractors and analogous terms, and
because the concept has been subsumed in the definition of . . . 'general contractor' as 'the
person who has undertaken to procure the performance of work or services,' the third-
party language in the subcontractor definition was most likely not included in the new Act
to conform the two definitions." Id. at 486-87 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 440.
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[T]he premises owner's own employees, working side-by-side with
the other contractors' employees, would be limited to workers' com-
pensation benefits for their injuries while the other contractors' em-
ployees injured in the same accident would be permitted to seek tort
remedies against the premises owner in addition to the workers'
compensation benefits provided by the premises owner. Unless the
statute directs such a result, it makes no sense to read the statute in
such an unreasonable manner. 56
Entergy is a defensible and reasonable analysis and construction of sec-
tion 406.121(1). Applying what it deemed to be the plain language of that
provision, the supreme court concluded, reasonably, that in certain cir-
cumstances and scenarios a premises owner can also be a general contrac-
tor for purposes of the workers' compensation statute and the exclusive
remedy defense.57 However, to say that the decision is defensible and
reasonable is not to say that the supreme court's decision is inexorably
"right" or "wrong," for other arguable, reasonable, and defensible inter-
pretations and constructions of the statute can be and were presented by
the parties. Thus, as the dissenting justices argued,58 the common mean-
ing of the term "contractor" usually refers to a person who undertakes to
perform work for other persons; on that view, Entergy, the premises
owner, was not and should not be considered to be a general contractor.
In any event, Entergy addresses a significant issue of workers' compensa-
tion law and provides a definitive answer to the statutory puzzle consid-
ered by the supreme court.
In another workers' compensation case, HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice,59 the
Texas Supreme Court considered the extent to which workers' compensa-
tion insurance must be provided by a general contractor in order for that
contractor to qualify for immunity from subcontractor employees' tort
actions. HCBeck entered into an agreement with FMR Texas Ltd. to
build an office campus on FMR's property. Included in that contract was
an FMR-provided workers' compensation insurance plan, which was part
of an owner-controlled insurance plan (OCIP) and was to be incorpo-
rated in any construction contract between HCBeck and any subcontrac-
tors. In addition, the FMR-HCBeck contract provided that FMR could
terminate or modify the insurance program at any time, and that in the
event of program termination, HCBeck was required to obtain (at FMR's
cost) other insurance covering HCBeck and all subcontractors and em-
ployees. HCBeck entered into a subcontract with Haley Greer, and as
required by the original agreement, Haley Greer enrolled in the OCIP
and received a separate workers' compensation policy in its name.60
56. Id. at 444; but see id. at 493 (O'Neill, J., dissenting) (arguing that any anomaly in
the treatment of side-by-side workers "is the result of policy choices made by the Legisla-
ture" and that the majority's position "overlooks the option the Act provides employees of
subscribing employers to elect not to be covered by workers' compensation").
57. Id. at 481.
58. See supra note 54.
59. 284 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2009).
60. See id. at 350-51.
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A Haley Greer employee, Charles Rice, was injured on the construc-
tion site and received workers' compensation benefits under the policy
provided by the OCIP. Rice then filed a negligence action against
HCBeck. Arguing that it had provided workers' compensation to Haley
Greer under section 406.123(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act,
HCBeck filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted.61 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, con-
cluding that HCBeck's contract with Haley Greer did not provide work-
ers' compensation insurance as required by state law. 6 2
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding that HCBeck
did provide insurance coverage, because Haley Greer's employees were
covered by the incorporated insurance plan and HCBeck was responsible
for obtaining and providing alternative coverage in the event FMR termi-
nated the insurance program. 63 Section 406.123(a) of the state workers'
compensation law provides that a "general contractor and a subcontrac-
tor may enter into a written agreement under which the general contrac-
tor provides workers' compensation insurance coverage to the
subcontractor and the employees of the subcontractor." 64 HCBeck com-
plied in full with this provision, the supreme court reasoned, because the
law does not require that a general contractor actually obtain or directly
pay for insurance.
The Act only requires that there be a written agreement to provide
workers' compensation insurance coverage. In this case, the cover-
age that was actually provided to Haley Greer by FMR under the
agreement was backed by HCBeck's specific obligation assuring that
Haley Greer remained covered in the event FMR decided to discon-
tinue its OCIP.6 5
Indeed, an employer is not required to provide workers' compensation
for its employees, the supreme court noted, and "is always free, for
whatever reason, to discontinue workers' compensation insurance." 66
Because the discontinuation of coverage results in the loss of the em-
ployer's exclusive remedy defense and immunization from negligence
suits, the Act incentivizes coverage; however, that incentive does not
change the fact that workers' compensation insurance, while encouraged,
is not required by law. 6 7
Considering the issue from a consequentialist perspective, the supreme
court posited that its holding "would allow multiple tiers of subcontrac-
tors to qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive remedy
defense. Such a scheme seems consistent with the benefits offered by
61. Id. at 351.
62. See Rice v. HCBeck, Ltd., 284 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006), rev'd
284 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2009).
63. HCBeck, Ltd., 284 S.W.3d at 360.
64. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.123(a) (Vernon 2006).
65. HCBeck, Ltd., 284 S.W.3d at 353-54.
66. Id. at 354.
67. Id. at 353-54.
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controlled insurance programs, which are designed to minimize the risk
that the subcontractors' employees will be left uncovered." 68 A contrary
holding that HCBeck had failed to provide coverage "would thwart the
usefulness of controlled insurance programs that allow the highest-tiered
entity to ensure quality and uninterrupted coverage to the lowest-tiered
employees." 69 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that the FMR
insurance policy provided by HCBeck to Haley Greer and Greer's em-
ployees afforded HCBeck the exclusive remedy defense and barred
Rice's negligence claims.70
IV. DISCRIMINATION
In AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, the plaintiff, Salvador Reyes, sued the em-
ployer after he was discharged at the age of sixty-two.71 Reyes contended
that he was fired because of his age, in violation of the Texas Commission
on Human Rights Act;7 2 the employer asserted that Reyes was fired for
sexually harassing a female coworker. The jury found in favor of the
plaintiff, and the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed.73
Reversing the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with
the employer that the evidence supporting the finding that age was a mo-
tivating factor in Reyes's discharge was legally insufficient.74 The em-
ployer argued, specifically, that statements made to a parts service
manager by a store manager to the effect that the employer intended to
get rid of "the old people" were "stray remarks" made by an individual
who was not part of and had no input into the decision to fire Reyes.75
Remarks and statements can constitute evidence of discrimination (i.e.,
are not stray remarks) "only if they are (1) related to the employee's
protected class, (2) close in time to the employment decision, (3) made by
an individual with authority over the employment decision, and (4) re-
68. Id. at 359.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 360. Dissenting Justice Phil Johnson, joined by Justice Medina, stated that
he would hold that a general contractor provides workers' compensation coverage "if the
general contractor 'puts something in the pot,' that is, if it contributes something of value
for statutory immunity." Id. at 364 (Johnson, J., dissenting). He complained that the ma-
jority's decision allowed HCBeck to enjoy statutory immunity by merely contracting for
the owner of a project or a subcontractor to obtain and maintain insurance. Where cover-
age is maintained by a subcontractor, "the general contractor would have contributed
nothing to the trade by the subcontractor's employees of their common law rights, yet may
claim statutory immunity because it contractualty 'provided' the insurance." Id.
71. 272 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
72. TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (Vernon 2006) (prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age).
73. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2007) (affirming as to liability but modifying damages), rev'd, 272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam).
74. AutoZone, Inc., 272 S.W.3d at 591.
75. Id. at 592 ("We have held that stray remarks are insufficient to establish discrimi-
nation and statements made remotely in time by someone not directly connected with ter-
mination decisions do not raise a fact issue about the reason for termination.").
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lated to the employment decision at issue." 76 Imputation of the discrimi-
natory animus of a person who is not the decision-maker requires
evidence "indicat[ing] that the person in question possessed leverage or
exerted influence over the decision-maker." 77
The supreme court concluded that the evidence showed that the store
manager played no part in, had no leverage over, and exerted no influ-
ence concerning the employer's investigation or decision to fire the plain-
tiff.78 The termination decision was made by a regional manager on the
basis of a recommendation made by a company employee relations spe-
cialist who had reviewed written statements obtained from the plaintiff,
the coworker that was allegedly harassed by the plaintiff, and other em-
ployees. The supreme court determined that no person involved in the
investigation or subsequent termination decision ever spoke to or took a
statement from the store manager, that the store manager "did not work
in the store in which the sexual harassment allegedly occurred," that the
store manager had no authority over the plaintiff until the plaintiff was
transferred to the manager's store while the harassment allegation was
being investigated, and that the store manager testified at the trial that he
had no involvement in the investigation or termination decision.79
As for the store manager's "get rid of 'the old people"' statements, the
supreme court found no evidence that the manager represented the em-
ployer's motive or intent.80 Even if the "statements were an expression
of what [the manager] thought to be AutoZone's purpose, there was no
evidence that [the manager] was involved in, had leverage over, or knew
or was in a position to know whether Reyes's age was a motivating reason
for the discharge."81 Indeed, as the supreme court noted, at trial the
store manager (who no longer worked for the employer) testified that he
was only communicating his personal opinion that the employer was at-
tempting to remove long-time managers who were not following the em-
ployer's policies, and the parts service manager (also no longer working
for the employer):
testified that he understood the [store manager's] statements to refer
to the length of time employees had been with AutoZone, not the
employees' age. When considered in context, as they must be, [the
store manager's] statements are not evidence that age was a motivat-
ing factor in any of AutoZone's decisions as to Reyes. 82
Recall that the jury in this case found in favor of the plaintiff and that






82. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, the supreme court held that the evidence failed
to establish that the employer subjected the plaintiff to disparate discipline and "discrimi-
nated against [him] by treating him less favorably than similarly-situated younger employ-
ees" who violated the company's sexual harassment policy. See id. at 593-95.
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the court of appeals affirmed that verdict.83 Could one reasonably con-
clude, contrary to the supreme court, that the plaintiff had been subjected
to unlawful age discrimination or that the "get rid of 'the old people"'
remarks showed that (it was more likely than not that) the employer con-
sidered and was motivated by the plaintiff's age? The supreme court's
decision serves as an important exemplar of the outcome-influential and
outcome-determinative role that legal doctrine can play in litigation. The
"stray remarks" doctrine addressed and indeed negated any evidentiary
value the "old people" statements may have had as a matter of law, re-
ducing that evidence to the musings and observations of a manager not
involved in the investigation of or the decision to fire the plaintiff.84 So
framed, the determination that the evidence was legally insufficient and
did not support the finding of age discrimination is an understandable
and warranted reading of the record evidence.
Tiner v. Texas Department of Transportation, decided by the Tyler
Court of Appeals, held that an employee suing her employer for sex dis-
crimination and retaliation was not constructively discharged and did not
suffer a remediable adverse employment action.85 As the court of ap-
peals explained, "[a] constructive discharge occurs when an employee
makes the reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working
conditions." 86 The court of appeals stated:
Whether an employee would feel forced to resign is case and fact
specific, but the following employment actions are relevant, singly or
in combination: 1) demotion, 2) reduction in salary, 3) reduction in
job responsibilities, 4) reassignment to menial or degrading work, 5)
reassignment to work under a younger or less experienced/qualified
supervisor, 6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer
calculated to encourage the employee's resignation, or 7) offers of
early retirement (or continued employment on terms less favorable
than the employee's former status).87
In May 2003, the plaintiff complained to her supervisor about a co-
worker's rude and obnoxious behavior and submitted a written complaint
on May 14, 2003. The coworker was discharged in June 2003. The plain-
tiff filed an additional complaint with the company when her supervisor
slammed a door in her face after arguing with her. Following that inci-
dent, a meeting was held with the plaintiff, her supervisor and a regional
supervisor. According to the plaintiff, in the time period between her
initial complaint about the coworker and her resignation, her supervisor
no longer talked to her and terminated her access to his e-mail account.
The plaintiff resigned in November 2003, noting in a resignation letter her
decision "to evaluate her 'current goals and investigate new opportuni-
83. See id. at 590-91.
84. See id. at 592-93.
85. 294 S.W.3d 390, 396-97 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.).
86. Id. at 394 (citing Baylor Univ. v. Coley, 221 S.W.3d 599, 604-05 (Tex. 2007)).
87. Id. at 395.
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ties." 88 Thereafter, in 2005, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that she
was constructively discharged and had been subjected to unlawful sex dis-
crimination and retaliation.
Granting the employer's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's action.89 Affirming that judgment, the court of
appeals found that the plaintiff "did not show that the working conditions
were unbearable, or that the employer was attempting to encourage her
to resign." 90 Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the employer's han-
dling of the issue with her coworker was improper, the court of appeals
opined that the "ordinary management problem" was promptly investi-
gated and the coworker was terminated approximately one month after
the plaintiff complained. 9' That response to the plaintiff's complaint pro-
vides no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the employer in any way
created unendurable working conditions, the court of appeals concluded,
or created a situation causing the plaintiff's resignation months later.92
Moreover, the evidence that her supervisor argued with and stopped talk-
ing to the plaintiff and ended her ability to e-mail him "does not rise to
the level of conduct designed to badger, harass, or humiliate" the plain-
tiff.9 3 Indeed, the court of appeals noted, the same supervisor's annual
job evaluation of the plaintiff's performance, given prior to her resigna-
tion, "contained no negative comments at all, and was generally compli-
mentary of her work performance." 9 4
Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff "failed
to show adverse employment action" such as a refusal to hire, a dis-
charge, or discrimination in "compensation or the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."95 Nor did she demonstrate the existence of
"materially adverse" actions that "might well have dissuaded a reasona-
ble worker from making or supporting" a complaint. 96 Instead, "[tihis
case represents a disagreement in the workplace as to how to manage a
difficult employee." 97 The plaintiff was not discharged, demoted, reas-
signed, or suspended; the "minor actions that did occur do not represent
meaningful changes in the conditions or privileges of her employment"
and would not "dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a protected complaint"; and the claim that the plaintiff's supervisor dis-
criminated against her because of her sex was not supported by the
evidence.98
88. Id. at 392.
89. Id.




94. Id. at 395-96.
95. Id. at 396; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051(1) (Vernon 2006).
96. See Tiner, 294 S.W.3d at 396 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
97. Id. at 397.
98. Id.
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As the court of appeals concluded, the facts of Tiner are not the facts of
a valid and actionable constructive discharge case in which an employee
resigns because of unbearable working conditions.99 A finding of con-
structive discharge on the facts presented would have transformed many
if not most ordinary workplace disputes and disagreements between em-
ployees and their employers and supervisors into termination disputes
and lawsuits resulting in costly and time-consuming litigation and aggra-
vation costs. As the court of appeals indicated, a finding of constructive
discharge should be limited to truly egregious situations in which plain-
tiffs suffer materially adverse employment actions and make the reasona-
ble decision to resign rather than continue to face unendurable working
conditions.'" The Tiner court of appeals correctly concluded that the
plaintiff in the case before it was not confronted with such a decision and
choice. 01
V. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Is a "covenant not to compete in an at-will employment agreement ...
enforceable when the employee expressly promises not to disclose confi-
dential information, but the employer makes no express return promise
to provide confidential information"?102 Answering that question in the
affirmative in Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, the
Texas Supreme Court held:
If the nature of the employment for which the employee is hired will
reasonably require the employer to provide confidential information
to the employee for the employee to accomplish the contemplated
job duties, then the employer impliedly promises to provide confi-
dential information and the covenant is enforceable so long as the
other requirements of the Covenant Not to Compete Act are
satisfied.103
In the case before the supreme court, Mann Frankfort, an accounting
and consulting firm, hired Brendan Fielding, a certified public accountant
who worked in Mann Frankfort's tax department. Fielding resigned in
1995 and was rehired in that same year as a senior tax department man-
ager. The rehire was conditioned on Fielding's signature on Mann Frank-
fort's at-will employment agreement, which contained this "client
purchase provision":
If at any time within one (1) year after the termination or expiration
hereof, Employee directly or indirectly performs accounting services
for remuneration for any party who is a client of Employer during
the term of this Agreement, Employee shall immediately purchase
99. Id. at 394-95.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 395.
102. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 845 (Tex.
2009).
103. Id. at 845-46.
2010] Employment Law 551
SMU LAW REVIEW
from Employer and Employer shall sell to employee that portion of
Employer's business associated with each such client.104
Upon executing the agreement, Fielding promised that he would "not dis-
close or use at any time . . . any secret or confidential information or
knowledge obtained by [Fielding] while employed." 05 A similar client
purchase provision was contained in a separate limited partnership agree-
ment signed by Fielding.
Subsequently, in 2004, Fielding resigned from Mann Frankfort and
opened an accounting firm with another individual. Filing a declaratory
judgment action, Fielding sought a judgment declaring unenforceable the
client purchase provisions in his employment and limited partnership
agreements with Mann Frankfort. The trial court granted Fielding a sum-
mary judgment, and on appeal, the Houston First Court of Appeals found
that the covenant not to compete was not enforceable for want of
consideration. 1 0 6
The supreme court reversed in an opinion by Justice Johnson.107 The
justice began his analysis by examining section 15.50(a) of the Covenants
Not to Compete Act:
[A] covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part
of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is
made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographi-
cal area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable
and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the
goodwill or other business interest of the promisee. 08
The supreme court considered two initial queries to determine if "an
enforceable covenant not to compete has been created under [this provi-
sion]: (1) is there an 'otherwise enforceable agreement,' and (2) was the
covenant not to compete 'ancillary to or part of' that agreement at the
time the otherwise enforceable agreement was made."109 As to the first
inquiry, Justice Johnson stated that in its 1994 Light decision, the supreme
court held that "'otherwise enforceable agreements' can emanate from
at-will employment so long as the consideration for any promise is not
illusory."110 Light also concluded that a unilateral contract-"formed if
one promise is illusory and the return promise is non-illusory"-does not
satisfy section 15.50.111 "[S]uch [a] unilateral contract, since it could be
accepted only by future performance, could not support a covenant not to
compete inasmuch as it was not an 'otherwise enforceable agreement at
104. Id. at 846 (quoting the provision).
105. Id.
106. See Hardy v. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 232, 247
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007), rev'd 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009).
107. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 852.
108. TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
109. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 849 (quoting Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883
S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1994)); see also Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Serv., L.P. v. Johnson, 209
S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).




the time the agreement [was] made' as required by § 15.50."112
With regard to the second inquiry, Justice Johnson opined that the su-
preme court has derived two requirements.' 13 First, the employer's con-
sideration given in the "otherwise enforceable agreement must give rise
to the employer's interest in restraining the employee from competing.
Second, the covenant [not to compete] must be designed to enforce the
employee's consideration or return promise in the otherwise enforceable
agreement." 114 In the absence of both elements and requirements, "the
covenant is a naked restraint of trade and unenforceable."115
Applying the law to the facts before the supreme court, Justice Johnson
determined that Mann Frankfort had to provide the confidential and tax
information of the company's clients to Fielding before Fielding could
perform his job as a certified public accountant." 6 Thus, "it was clear
that by the nature of his duties as a senior manager in the firm's Tax
Department, Fielding would be required to have and use information
confidential to the firm."1 17 Significantly, Fielding "promised in his em-
ployment agreement to 'not disclose or use at any time . . . any secret or
confidential information"' obtained while he was employed by Mann
Frankfort.xi 8 Justice Johnson pointed out, correctly, that "Fielding could
not have acted on his promise to refrain from disclosing confidential in-
formation unless Mann Frankfort provided him with it."119 Hence, Field-
ing's promise "meant nothing without a correlative commitment by Mann
Frankfort."1 20
Justice Johnson concluded that "Mann Frankfort impliedly promised to
supply confidential information to Fielding when the parties entered into
the 1995 agreement," and that the 1995 agreement was illusory because
Mann Frankfort could have terminated Fielding prior to granting him ac-
cess to such information.121 A critical question still had to be answered:
Did Mann Frankfort and Fielding form an "otherwise enforceable agree-
ment" under and within the meaning of section 15.50?122 Yes, said Jus-
tice Johnson, the agreement was formed when the company "performed
its illusory promise by actually providing confidential information."1 2 3
Moreover, Justice Johnson determined that Mann Frankfort's implied
promise and act of providing Fielding with access to confidential informa-
tion generated the company's interest in preventing the disclosure of the









121. Id. at 851-52.
122. See id. at 852.
123. See id. (citing Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Serv., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651
(Tex. 2006) (a "unilateral contract formed when the employer performs a promise that was
illusory when made can satisfy the requirements of the [Covenant Not to Compete] Act")).
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information, thereby satisfying the first prong of section 15.50's "'ancil-
lary or part of' an otherwise enforceable agreement" analysis.124 And the
second prong and requirement of that analysis was also satisfied when
Fielding promised not to disclose confidential information, as evidenced
by the "client purchase provision [that] was designed to hinder [his] abil-
ity to use the confidential information to compete against Mann Frank-
fort."12 5 Accordingly, the supreme court held that the 1995 employment
agreement's client purchase provision between Mann Frankfort and
Fielding was enforceable, and it reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals.126
VI. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED TORT LAW
Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto addressed the interesting ques-
tion of whether an employer has a limited duty to third parties for the off-
site tortious activities of off-duty workers fatigued by working condi-
tions.127 In that case, nineteen-year-old oil field employee Robert Am-
briz ended a twelve-hour shift at 6:00 a.m. and left the work site
approximately ten minutes later. Prior to leaving the site, one of Am-
briz's coworkers told Ambriz to stay at the site in trailers provided by the
company, but Ambriz left. At approximately 6:30 a.m., Ambriz was driv-
ing down a road; his car crossed over to the wrong side of the road and
collided with a vehicle. Ambriz and the driver and three passengers of
the struck vehicle were all killed. The decedents' estates sued Ambriz's
estate and Nabors Drilling, alleging that Ambriz and the company's negli-
gence caused the collision. The jury, awarding the plaintiffs $5.95 million,
"found that Ambriz was 57% responsible for the accident and [the com-
pany] was 43% responsible."1 2 8 The trial court granted the company's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.129 On appeal, the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Nabors Drilling
owed a duty to the plaintiffs to protect them from employees' work-re-
lated fatigue.' 30
A unanimous Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.131
Writing for the supreme court, Justice Green observed, "An employer
ordinarily will not be liable for torts committed by off-duty employees
except when the torts were committed on the employer's premises or
with the employer's chattels."132 Limited exceptions to this general rule




127. 288 S.W.3d 401, 403-04 (Tex. 2009).
128. Id. at 404.
129. Id.
130. See Escoto v. Ambriz, 200 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006), rev'd
sub. nom. Nabors, 288 S.W.3d at 413.
131. Nabors, 288 S.W.3d at 413.
132. Id. at 404 (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965))).
[Vol. 63554
Employment Law
atively exercised control over its employee because of that employee's
incapacity, and when an employer required its employee to consume al-
cohol to the point of intoxication while working." 133 In the supreme
court's view, neither exception imposed a duty on Nabors Drilling.134
Addressing the position of the court of appeals that the company "was
aware of the dangers of fatigue and that a coworker from the night shift
before [Ambriz's] accident testified that the shift was particularly ex-
hausting, and '[W]e were all tired,"' the supreme court found no record
of evidence that the company knew that Ambriz was exhibiting any inca-
pacity. 35 In fact, the supreme court continued, "Ambriz's supervisor ob-
served that Ambriz was 'fit and ready to go to work,"' and "a coworker
who observed Ambriz at the end of his shift testified that Ambriz did not
look or act tired," and the same employee who stated, "[W]e were all
tired," also testified that Ambriz "looked all right" and "was fine" and
"didn't act like he was" tired.136 Furthermore, "the record indicates that
Ambriz never complained about [work] fatigue, never had trouble stay-
ing awake while driving, and stayed in the trailers provided by [the com-
pany] when he thought he was too tired to drive" after a night shift.137
An employer must have "more than general awareness of employee fa-
tigue-an employer must have actual knowledge that its employee was
impaired when leaving work on the day of the accident."s38 Applying
this standard, the supreme court concluded, "The evidence does not es-
tablish that Nabors had that requisite knowledge of any incapacity of
Ambriz at the end of his shift."139
Nor did the company affirmatively "exercise any post-incapacity con-
trol over its employee" or "instruct Ambriz to drive home or escort him
to his car. . . . The only control that Nabors exercised was in establishing
work conditions and setting the shift work schedule, and [this] occurred
before any incapacity on Ambriz's part." 140 The supreme court declined
to create a duty in such circumstances:141 "We hold that because Nabors
took no affirmative action as a result of any perceived employee fatigue
or incapacity . . . Nabors owed no legal duty to the plaintiffs in this
case."142
Why did the supreme court decline to create a common-law duty in the
circumstances presented in Nabors Drilling? The justices were con-
133. Id. at 405.
134. Id.




139. Id. at 406-07.
140. Id. at 407.
141. Id.; see also id. ("Every other court of appeals to address the issue has rejected
such a duty.").
142. Id. at 408; see also id. at 410-12 (rejecting the plaintiffs' request for the imposition
of "a new [common-law] duty on Texas employers whose work conditions may contribute
to fatigue in an off-duty employee"); id. at 412-13 (declining "to create a new duty requir-
ing employers to train employees about [the dangers of] fatigue").
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cerned, in my view correctly, about the utility and consequences of im-
posing such a duty in cases of fatigue. While employers could conduct
fatigue inspections at the end of an employee's work shift, "it is not clear
that an employer could consistently judge when employees have gone be-
yond tired and become impaired." 1 4 3 Nor is it "clear that employers
could effectively prevent impairment due to fatigue because amounts and
types of work will affect employees differently, and an employee's off-
duty conduct will affect when and how the employee may become fa-
tigued."144 Furthermore, which occupations would and should be gov-
erned by the duty? As the supreme court noted, "[c]onsidering the large
number of Texans who do shift work and work long hours (including doc-
tors, nurses, lawyers, police officers, and others), there is little social or
economic utility in requiring every employer to somehow prevent em-
ployee fatigue or take responsibility for the actions of off-duty, fatigued
employees." 145 Given its consequentialist and utilitarian concerns, it is
not surprising that the supreme court refused to create a legal duty re-
quiring employers to prevent injuries to third parties resulting from em-
ployee fatigue and occurring after the employee has completed her work
schedule.
VII. CONCLUSION
The employment law decisions discussed in this Article provided spe-
cific answers to legal questions involving the arbitration of employment-
related claims, the scope and coverage of the state's workers' compensa-
tion law, the operation of statutes prohibiting discrimination in the work-
place, the consideration necessary for the enforcement of a covenant not
to compete, and a claim that an employer has a legal duty to third parties
with respect to the injuries caused by the employer's fatigued, off-site,
and off-duty employees. The reader will notice that those who chal-
lenged employer conduct in those decisions did not prevail and that they
did not reflect the difficulty of bringing and successfully prosecuting an
employment law claim under current law, doctrine, and precedent. While
the question of whether this is a problematic or salutary development is
not analyzed or answered here, it is an important query warranting fur-
ther consideration in future editions of the Texas Survey.
143. Id. at 410.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 410-11.
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